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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Utah constitution and U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did Associated Title, a title company acting as 
trustee under a deed of trust, have authority at a trustee's 
sale to purchase the trust property on behalf of the 
beneficiary, Bodell Construction, the plaintiff-appellant in 
this action? 
2. Does the grant of "full and complete authority 
regarding this foreclosure action," with the understanding that 
title to the trust property would be transferred to the 
beneficiary, imply authority in the trustee to complete the 
trustee's sale? 
3. Did the trustee, Associated Title, have apparent 
authority to complete the sale? 
4. Did the plaintiff-appellant, Bodell Construction 
Company, ratify the trustee's sale? 
5. Does a beneficiary have discretion to abrogate a 
trustee's sale when it is discovered that the sale was not 
advantageous to it? 
STATUTES M P CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Snelson does not contend that the interpretation of any 
stature or rule of procedure is determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bodell Construction filed its complaint to recover a 
deficiency after a trustee's sale of real property situated in 
Utah County. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that plaintiff had conducted two trustee's sales, and was 
bound by the first at which it had bid in the entire debt owed 
by defendants. (R. 231-235.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment contending that Associated Title, the 
trustee, had no authority to bid at the sale. (R. 190-210.) 
Summary Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants in May, 
1987. (R.268.) Bodell's appeal of that decision to the Supreme 
Court was dismissed because of lack of a Rule 54(b) order. 
(R.4 62.) The trial court allowed the parties to augment the 
record and, after a second hearing, entered an order again 
determining that plaintiff was bound by the first trustee's sale 
and granting summary judgment to defendants. (R.5 68.) The 
trial court included in its Order a Rule 54 (b) determination of 
finality. This case was transferred from the Supreme Court to 
the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1990. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
FACTUAL OVERVIEW 
In the District Court, and in Appellant's Brief, Bodell 
grounds his argument for the invalidity of the trustee's sale on 
the confusion that arose among him and his agents concerning the 
price to be bid at the sale. The district court concluded that 
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these purported "disputed facts" did not contradict or raise any 
issues as to the material facts upon which defendants relied, 
and that the undisputed facts showed that plaintiff's agent had 
actual and apparent authority to enter the bid. Moreover, 
plaintiff had ratified the sale after he had full knowledge of 
the facts surrounding it. 
The following summary of the facts and arguments that were 
germane to the motion for summary judgment, place in context the 
uncontested facts that follow. 
Michael Bodell is a principal of plaintiff-appellant Bodell 
Construction Company, Inc. (Bodell Depo. R.58 9 at 7.) Both are 
sometimes referred to hereinafter as "Bodell." Landmark Mortgage 
Company is owned and controlled by Roger Terry and engages in 
the mortgage brokering and arranging business. (Terry Depo. 
R.587 at 6, 8.) Associated Title Company is a title company 
that sometimes acts as trustee and conducts trustee's sales 
under trust deeds. Blake Heiner is an employee of Associated 
Title Company. (Heiner Depo. R. 588 at 4-6.) 
Roger Terry ("Terry") and his company, Landmark Mortgage 
Company ("Landmark"), arranged and brokered a $200,000 mortgage 
loan from Bodell Construction to defendants Snelson and 
McOmbers, Property owned by McOmber was conveyed by trust deed 
to a trustee to secure the loan. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 14-15.) 
(Associated Title was a successor trustee.) Snelson and 
McOmbers were unable to pay as agreed, and Bodell instructed 
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Landmark and the title company of its choice to initiate a 
foreclosure of the Trust Deed securing the loan. (Bodell Depo. 
R.589 at 25-26.) Pursuant to Bodell's authorization, Terry 
hired Associated Title Company to act as trustee on Bodellfs 
behalf in connection with the foreclosure. At the trustee's 
sale, Associated Title bid the full amount then owed on behalf 
of Bodell Construction. Bodell thereafter unsuccessfully 
attempted to sell the property for about the same amount. Being 
unable to do so, Bodell spoke to his lawyer, who suggested that 
Bodell (1) claim that the trustee was unauthorized to bid the 
full loan amount, (2) rescind the original sale, (3) conduct a 
new sale at a lower price, and (4) sue the borrowers for a 
deficiency. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 84-89.) This was 
accomplished, and after the new sale at the lesser price, Bodell 
initiated this deficiency action against McOmbers and Snelson. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment after the 
record was augmented, Bodell did not contradict any of the 
following facts. Indeed, at the outset of the oral argument, 
his attorney said: 
Both parties have represented there's no issues 
of material fact. We both argued that. I'm not 
inclined to believe that's true at the present 
time, but having previously said it, I'm not 
going to retreat from my position. 
(Transcript of Hearing, R.590 at 6.) Virtually all of the 
following facts are based on the deposition of Mr. Bodell 
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himself, except statements going to the formality of the 
trusteefs sale. 
1. Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage had arranged 8 to 12 
mortgage loans for Bodell. All were handled in basically the 
same manner—Terry brought Bodell a loan application package 
describing the prospective loan, assisted in the closing of the 
loan, serviced the loan by collecting payments, handled 
communications on behalf of Bodell with the owner/debtor, and, 
when foreclosure was necessary, Terry handled it for Bodell. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 15-17.) 
2. In late 1983, Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage 
arranged the subject loan for Bodell. Bodell loaned $200,000 to 
the McOmbers and Snelson. Among other things, Terry gave Bodell 
an appraisal showing that the McOmber house was worth $300,000. 
Bodell himself did not look at the property before making the 
loan. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 14-15, 18.) The loan was to bear 
18 percent per annum as interest and was secured by the McOmber 
residence. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 14-15 and Depo. Exhibit 2.) 
3. McOmbers and Snelson did not make a payment under the 
loan and so Bodell caused foreclosure proceedings to be 
initiated. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 24-25.) 
4. Bodell directed Terry to assist him in proceeding with 
foreclosure. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 25.) He drafted and 
delivered to Terry a letter addressed to Landmark mortgage 
Company dated January 9, 1984, which stated as follows: 
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Gentlemen, 
Please accept this letter as authorization to 
immediately begin foreclosure against the 
property associated with this loan. 
We hereby grant you and the title company of 
your choice tall and complete authority 
regarding this foreclosure action. 
Please inform me if you require further 
information. 
Very truly yours, 
s/Michael J. Bodell [Emphasis added.] 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 25-27 and Depo. Exhibit 5.) Bodell knew 
that Terry was going to give this letter to a title company and 
assumed that the title company would rely on it. (Bodell Depo. 
R.589 at 26.) Terry gave this letter to Associated Title 
Company. (Terry Depo. R.587 at 40.) 
5. During April, 1984, Bodell signed a Substitution of 
Trustee, appointing Associated Title Company as successor 
trustee under the McOmber Trust Deed. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 
34-35.) 
6. In early May, 1984, Bodell requested that Terry furnish 
him with the appraisal on the McOmber property that was a part 
of the loan application package because Bodell wanted some idea 
of the value of the property being foreclosed. (Bodell Depo. 
R.589 at 39-40.) That appraisal indicated that the value of the 
McOmber property was $300,000. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 18; Depo. 
Exhibit 1.) Bodell received no other appraisal prior to the 
trustee's sale. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 40.) 
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7. Associated Title Company issued a Notice of Trustee's 
Sale under the McOmber Trust Deed on July 30, 1984. That Notice 
of Trustee's Sale scheduled the sale for August 31, 1984. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589, Exhibit 11.) Associated Title Company 
mailed the Notice of Trustee's Sale both to Landmark Mortgage 
Company and to Bodell on July 31, 1984, and both Landmark 
Mortgage Company and Bodell received the Notice of Trustee's 
Sale on August 1, 1984. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 44-45 and 110.) 
8. Bodell knew, prior to August 31, 1984, that there was 
going to be a trustee's sale under the McOmber Trust Deed at 
that time. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 45.) Bodell expected that 
Bodell Construction would buy the property at the sale. (Bodell 
Depo. R.589 at 52.) Nevertheless, (1) Bodell never spoke with 
anyone at Associated Title Company prior to the sale and (2) 
Bodell did not convey any bidding instructions to Landmark or 
Terry prior to the sale. Bodell knew that Associated Title 
Company could not have received any bidding instructions prior 
to the sale. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 47-48, 52, and 57.) 
Bodell had a number of conversations with Mr. and Mrs. McOmber 
and their attorney in reference to the pending sale. (Bodell 
Depo. R.58 9 at 4 6.) He had several conversations with Roger 
Terry (IA. at 46-47) . He made all of his arrangements with 
Roger Terry (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 48, 109) . This was the 
largest second mortgage loan Bodell had made by far (Bodell Depo 
R.589 at 109). 
7 
9. The testimony differed as to the bidding instructions 
that were given to Associated Title Company. There were 
disputed facts in this area, but these facts were irrelevant to 
the motion for summary judgment before the district court. The 
parties' differing versions are included here only because they 
will be helpful to the Court's understanding of the overall 
facts and because appellant Bodell bases his arguments for 
Associated Title's lack of authority to bid entirely on the 
purported confusion among him, Mr. Terry and Mr. Heiner. 
(a) Associated asserts that it telephoned Terry or his 
office and requested instructions as to what should 
be bid at the trustee's sale and thereafter 
received a telephone message stating that the 
payoff at the sale was to be $243,127.15. (Heiner 
Depo. R.588 at 9-10.) 
(b) Terry asserts that Associated requested a "payoff," 
and Terry called Associated Title Company with a 
"payoff amount," which was the full amount owed 
under the loan, including a part of Terry's 
commission on the loan that was then unpaid. 
(Terry Depo. R.587 at 56; Affidavit of Roger Terry 
(Terry Depo. R.587 Exhibit 24).) 
(c) Bodell asserts that Associated should have bid the 
fair market value of the property, but concedes 
that he gave no one any bidding instructions and 
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that no one ever told Associated Title Company what 
the fair market value was. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 
62-65.) 
10. The trustee's sale was conducted on August 31, 1984, 
and Associated made a bid $243,681.90 on behalf of Bodell and 
purchased the property for Bodell Construction. (Bodell Depo. 
R.589, Exhibit 14.) 
11. On September 4, 1984, Blake Heiner signed a Trustee's 
Deed on behalf of Associated Title by which Associated Title 
conveyed to Bodell Construction the McOmber property (Terry 
Depo. R. 587, Exhibit 16). This Deed was recorded at the Utah 
County Recorder's Office on September 11, 1984 (III.) The 
Trustee's Deed recites, and Heiner confirmed by his examination 
of the documents prior to his deposition, that the sale was 
conducted in full compliance with Utah statutes (Heiner Depo. R. 
588, at 35). 
12. Within a week to ten days after the sale on August 31, 
1984, Bodell was told by Terry that the sale had occurred and 
that approximately $240,000 had been bid for the property. 
(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 67-68.) Bodell testified that, in the 
same conversation, he objected to the amount bid by Associated 
Title Company. (Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 79-80.) 
13. After learning of the sale and bid amount, Bodell 
contacted Cal Monson, a realtor, to list and sell the property. 
Bodell, as owner, signed a Listing Agreement with Monson, 
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authorizing Monson to sell the property for $239,000. (Bodell 
Depo. R. 589 at 70-72, Exhibit 16.) When Bodell signed the 
Listing Agreement as owner, he knew that Bodell Construction 
owned the property because it had purchased it at a trustee's 
sale, that the bid price had been wrong at that trustee's sale, 
and that Bodell did not like the bid. (Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 
71, 80.) 
14. During late September, 1984, Bodell received from 
Roger Terry a rent check in the amount of $200.00 from Jeff and 
Kathy Kober, who were renting the bottom portion of the McOmber 
home. Bodell cashed the check. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 73-74, 
Exhibit 17.) At the time he cashed the check, Bodell understood 
that the money was rent from people who lived in the basement of 
the property that he had purchased at a foreclosure sale, that 
the bid price was wrong at the foreclosure sale, and that he 
objected to that bid price. (Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 74, 80.) 
15. If someone had approached Bodell on September 12, 1984 
(after Bodell knew of the trustee's sale and the amount bid at 
that sale), and offered to purchase the property for $239,000 in 
cash, he would have sold it to them. (Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 
72-73.) 
16. During early October, 1984, Bodell became concerned 
about whether the property was worth what had been bid for it, 
and so Bodell called his attorney, Richard Rappaport, "because I 
wanted to know what we do now that it's becoming obvious to me 
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that the property isn't going to solve my debt problem. Isn't 
going to be, isn't going to net us anywhere near what is owed 
us. So the next step was, well, how do we get the difference." 
(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 77-78.) 
17. On October 3, 1984, Bodell and Terry met with Bodellfs 
counsel, Richard Rappaport. At that meeting, according to 
Terry's notes, with which Bodell agrees, "Mr. Rappaport said to 
get bid down must claim trustee did not have authority to bid 
amount he did." (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 82-83, Exhibit 13.) 
18. Thereafter, Rappaport, Bodell, and Terry attempted to 
undo the effects of the first trustee's sale: 
(a) Mr. Rappaport instructed Mr. Terry to call the 
McOmbers and tell them that an error was made and 
that they could stay in the house for another 30 
days. (Bodell Depo. R. 58 9 at 84, Exhibit 13.) 
(b) Bodell also instructed Terry to tell McOmbers to 
keep the home on the market but that the ownership 
listing would have to be changed (to reflect 
McOmbers as owner, rather than Bodell, as owner). 
(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 85, Exhibit 13.) 
(c) McOmbers did in fact execute a Listing Agreement as 
owners with Cal Monson dated October 4, 1984. 
(Bodell Depo. R. 589 at 85, Exhibit 18.) 
(d) Mr. Rappaport directed Associated Title Company to 
record a Quit Claim Deed conveying the property 
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from Bodell Construction Company back to Associated 
Title Company, as trustee, so that another 
trustee's sale could be conducted. (Bodell Depo. R. 
589 at 94, Exhibit 19.) 
(e) Bodell secured a new appraisal, dated November 6, 
1984, to determine the fair market value of the 
property. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 95.) 
(f) At the request of Mr. Rappaport, Associated Title 
Company thereafter conducted a second trustee's 
sale of the property on November 19, 1984 and, at 
the direction of Bodell, bid $170,000. (Affidavit 
of Blake T. Heiner, 1 6.) 
These facts were undisputed before the District Court. The 
"disputed facts" that appellant has raised in its brief go only 
to Bodell, Terry and Heiner's purported misunderstanding about 
the bid price. The undisputed material facts show clearly that 
defendants-appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The first trustee's sale conducted on August 31, 1984 was 
valid and binding on Bodell. Bodell's agent, Associated Title 
had authority to enter a bid. Bodell had written a letter 
granting Landmark Mortgage "and the title company of your choice 
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full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure action," 
and Landmark had chosen Associated Title to handle the 
foreclosure. 
Not only did Associated Title have the express authority 
created by the letter, but it also had implied authority, that 
is, authority incidental to the broader authority given. Bodell 
authorized and directed his agents to complete the foreclosure 
and effect the transfer of the title to Bodell Construction. 
This could not have been accomplished without bidding at the 
trustee's sale. Although there was some confusion between him 
and his agents and between Landmark Mortgage and Associated 
Title concerning the amount to be bid, the claims that have 
arisen from this confusion are between Bodell and his agents. 
Associated Title also had apparent authority to make the 
bid. It was clothed with the appearance of authority by Bodell, 
the defendant-trustors (McOmber) were given notice that a sale 
would be held and Bodell negotiated with them, and their 
interest in the trust property was terminated by the sale. 
These facts satisfy the requirements of (1) acts by the 
principal (Bodell), (2) reliance by the third person (McOmber), 
and (3) a change in the third persons circumstances. 
Bodell ratified Associated Title's acts and the trustee's 
sale. After learning of the sale and the price bid at it, 
Bodell did not object to Associated Title but proceeded to treat 
the property as Bodell Construction's by listing it for sale in 
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Bodell Construction's name, by negotiating with McOmber to 
remain in the property pending sale, and by accepting rents from 
the property. Bodell testified that if someone had offered him 
the $239,000 for which he had listed the property, he would have 
sold it. It was only when he decided that the property was not 
worth what he listed it for that Bodell decided to claim his 
trustee acted beyond his authority. 
Bodell cannot declare that the first sale was invalid and 
hold a second for his own benefit to the prejudice of the 
trustors. The procedural requirements for trustee's sales are 
intended to protect the debtor/trustors, and there is a strong 
presumption of the validity of a trustee's sale unless the 
interests of the trustor are prejudiced by an irregularity. 
There is no claim here of procedural irregularity; the sale 
conformed in all respect with statutory requirements. Bodell 
was motivated to abrogate the first sale not by any procedural 
problems, but only when it became "obvious to me that the 
property isn't going to solve my debt problem . . . . So the 
next step was, well, how do we get the difference." (Bodell 
Depo. R.589 at 77-78.) The answer to this question is recorded 
in a note made by Roger Terry of a meeting on October 3, 1984, 
between Bodell, Terry and Bodell's attorney: "Mr. Rappaport 
said to get bid down must claim trustee did not have authority 
to bid amount he did." (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 82, Exhibit 13.) 
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Bodell testified "That in essence is the way I remember it." 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 83.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT SHOWED 
THAT ASSOCIATED TITLE HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE BID 
The actual authority of an agent to act on behalf of his 
principal may be either express or implied. Clark v. Gneiting, 
95 Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278, 279-280 (1972). The Utah Supreme 
Court has said: 
The actual authority of an agent may be implied 
from the words and conduct of the parties and 
the fact and circumstances attending the 
transaction in question. Implied authority 
embraces authority to do whatever acts are 
incidental La* or axe necessary, usual, and 
proper to accomplish or perform, the main 
authority expressly delegated Lo Lh£ agent. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Bowen v. 01senr 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978). In B & R Supply 
Co. v. Brinahurst. 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972) 
the court said: 
[W]here a principal . . . entrusts a duty to his 
agent or employee, the latter is clothed with 
implied authority to do those things which are 
within the scope of assigned duties or 
reasonably and necessarily incident thereto. 
This is black-letter law. see, 2A C.J.S. "Agency" §154 at 779. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 35, states the rule as 
follows: 
§ 35 When Incidental Authority is Inferred 
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Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a 
transaction include authority to do acts which 
are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or 
are reasonably necessary to accomplish it. 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, Associated Title 
clearly had implied actual authority to enter the bid at the 
August 29, 1984 Trustee's sale. 
In the letter quoted in full at Paragraph 4 of the 
Undisputed Material Facts, supra, Michael J. Bodell, the 
principal of plaintiff appellant Bodell Construction, granted to 
Landmark "and the title company of your choice full and 
complete authority regarding this foreclosure action." (Bodell 
Depo. R. 589, Exhibit 5.) There are no expressed restrictions 
on this full and complete authority or implied restrictions 
elsewhere in the letter or in the conduct and actions of the 
parties thereafter. 
Bodell argues that the grant of authority was limited by 
the words of the letter granting authorization "to immediately 
begin foreclosure." (Brief of Appellant at 14.) However, Mr. 
Bodell paid close attention to the foreclosure proceedings, was 
in frequent contact with Mr. Terry about the progress of the 
foreclosure, often phoned Mr. McOmber, who had conveyed the 
property as collateral and lived in the house, was aware that 
the trustee's sale would occur when it did, and, even though he 
was out of town on that day, phoned immediately when he returned 
to inquire about the sale. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 45, 107-114.) 
It is not credible that the letter granting "full and complete 
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authority" was meant to limit that grant to only the beginning 
of the foreclosure proceedings. The plain words of the letter 
do not bear this meaning. 
Certainly, Mr. Bodell did not act on the premise that 
authority to conduct the foreclosure was limited to its 
beginning steps. He relied on Mr. Terry and Associated Title 
throughout the foreclosure procedures from their inception to 
the time the Trustee's deed was recorded. 
Although the grant of authority is not ambiguous, 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 42 bears on Bodellfs argument: 
If the authorization is ambiguous, the 
interpretation acted on by the parties controls. 
The comment to § 42 states: 
The subsequent conduct of the parties to an 
agreement with reference to it is determinative, 
unless it is so clearly expressed in view of the 
attendant circumstances that it cannot 
reasonably be given the interpretation which the 
parties indicate by their conduct. 
The grant of authority at issue here was clear in its initial 
statement in the January 9, 1984 letter, and the conduct of the 
parties was consistent with it throughout the foreclosure 
proceedings. 
At pages 19 through 23 of the Brief of Appellant, Bodell 
argues that the custom and usage of the title business did not 
authorize Associated Title to purchase the property on behalf of 
Bodell. The defendants never relied on any custom or usage in 
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their motion for summary judgment; these arguments are 
irrelevant. 
Michael Bodell authorized the purchase of the property for 
Bodell Construction at the trustee's sale. There was some 
alleged confusion about what price should be bid at the sale. 
Bodell has brought a separate action in the Third Judicial 
District claiming that Associated Title negligently entered the 
bid that extinguished the debt. This controversy, however, is 
between Associated Tittle and Bodell; it does not involve the 
defendant in this action. 
There was no dispute in the record that Bodell expected 
Roger Terry to get the complete the foreclosure for him: 
Q And you knew that if Bodell wanted to bid 
on the property at the sale someone had to 
bid for it, correct? 
A I can't remember specifically with that at 
the time. But somebody had to do 
something. It wasn't just going to happen 
alone. I knew that. 
Q What arrangements did you make to ensure 
that somebody would appear at the sale or 
that somebody would bid at the sale for you 
or that—to assure that the interest of 
Bodell would be taken care of at the sale. 
What arrangements did you make: 
A The only arrangements I personally made was 
conversations with Roger that it was being 
handled that I can remember. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 48.) 
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As authorized in the January 9 letter, Roger Terry and the 
title company of his choice were to do whatever was necessary to 
protect Bodell's interest and complete the foreclosure: 
Q Did you direct anybody to do whatever you 
had in your mind to appear on your behalf 
and protect your interests at the sale? 
A Yes, I think that would be fair. 
Q Who? 
A Roger Terry. Make sure that the right 
parties were doing that. 
Q Anybody else? 
A Not that I can think of. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 52.) 
Although he claims not to have known exactly what would 
transpire at the trustee's sale, he did know that Bodell 
Construction would buy the property at the sale: 
Q Did you expect Bodell Construction to buy 
the property at the sale? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you think that was going to happen? 
A I didn't know the specific mechanics at the 
time, but again I can't remember what I was 
think right then. But with what I now know 
and so forth it would be fair to say that I 
knew there would be some kind of an auction 
or process whereby we got deeded over the 
land. I knew there had been a posting in 
the neighborhood and something to that 
effect. 
Q Did you ever give Mr. Terry any 
instructions or authority to bid on your 
behalf at the sale? 
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A No. 
Q Did you give anybody any instructions or 
authority to bid on your behalf at the ale? 
A Not that I can think of. I was never asked 
about bid amount at the sale. 
Q Again, the only person you were 
communicating with on these subjects of the 
sale and bidding and the like were Mr. 
Terry; is that right? 
A That is correct, at that point in time. 
Q Okay. Based upon everything that happened 
before the scheduled sale date what did you 
think was going to appear at that sale? 
A I think we've discussed that before. I 
don't know the exact mechanics, but again 
there was going to be a legal process 
whereby we either got paid off or we 
acquired the property. 
Q Did you know any more than that? 
A I just can't honestly say. I am sure I 
knew something more than that. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 52-54.) 
Clearly, Mr. Bodell was leaving much of the "mechanics" of 
the foreclosure to his agents. He expected obtain title to 
property, and this is what he instructed his agents to do for 
him. Perhaps Mr. Terry or Associated Title should have given 
him advice he did not get, or perhaps they performed their 
duties as Bodell's agents in a careless or negligent fashion, 
but they did do what he had authorized them to do. 
The property could not have been obtained for Bodell 
without a bid at the trustee's sale. Associated Title 
understood that it had authority to make the bid. 
20 
Q What was your understanding of that? 
[July 9, 1986 letter.] 
A I understood that to mean that Landmark 
Mortgage, Roger Terry, and Associated Title 
had complete authority granted from Bodell 
to conduct the foreclosure without 
reservation. 
Q You never understood that Associated Title 
had authority to determine what was going 
to be bid at the sale, did you? 
A Well, reading this letter it could be 
interpreted as saying that yes, we did have 
that authority. It is not our practice to 
do so, however, or was not the practice in 
this case. 
Q You didn't understand that you had that 
authority. 
A We would have not exercised that authority 
in any case. But the clear language of the 
letter gives us that authority or gives 
Associated Title that authority by way of 
Landmark Mortgage. 
Q So it's your interpretation that this 
letter gives you authority whether 
exercised or not to determine the amount of 
the bid at the sale. 
A Correct. 
Q And you would have had that authority 
without any need to go to the beneficiary 
of the trust deed for any amount? 
A That's correct. 
Q And is it your contention then that 
Landmark had that same authority? 
A Yes. 
(Heiner Dep R.5887 at 21-22.) 
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Associated Title also thought that it had obtained a price 
to be bid at the sale. (Heiner Dep R.588 at 9-10.) Clearly, 
Associated Title would not have made a bid it thought was 
unauthorized. However, whether the bid price was authorized is 
between Mr. Bodell and Mr. Terry, and Associated Title. There 
can be no question that Landmark Mortgage and Associated Tittle 
were authorized and instructed to obtain title to the property 
pursuant to the deed of trust. To do this, a bid was necessary, 
and the authority to make it must be implied as part of the 
entire process. 
Comment b. to Restatement (Second) of Agency § 35 ("When 
Incidental Authority is Inferred" quoted above) states: 
b. It is seldom that the words of a 
principal are sufficiently specific to include 
or exclude all the acts which he expects the 
agent to do or not to do. In most cases the 
principal does not think of, far less 
specifically direct, the series of acts 
necessary to accomplish his objects. Almost all 
directions are ambiguous without knowledge of 
the background in which they are given. All 
include by implication authorization to do what 
is necessary in order to accomplish the end. 
The specific words which the principal uses must 
tie interpreted sn that his ob jeot can he. 
accomplished by the agent. (Emphasis added.) 
If Associated Title had not been authorized to make a bid, 
it could not have accomplished what Bodell wanted it to do, and 
the entire foreclosure procedure would be in vain. As is 
stated in Comment c. to § 35: 
c. The rule stated in this Section applies 
more broadly to the authorization of a general 
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agent than to that of a special agent, but it 
applies in the latter case also. In either 
case, it is inferred that the principal is not 
doing a vain thing, but intends to give a 
workable and effective consent. It is not 
essential to the authorization of an act that 
the principal should have contemplated that the 
agent would perform it as incidental to the 
authorized performance. (Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, Bodell's argument that he had not authorized the 
bid rests essentially on the fact that he did not contemplate 
the bid specifically when he told Terry (and through Terry, 
Associated Title), to get the foreclosure completed. 
Throughout these proceedings, Bodell has insisted that 
Associated Title had actual authority to do everything necessary 
to complete the Trustee's sale that would divest the McOmbers of 
title and transfer title to Bodell, except make a bid at the 
Trustee's Sale. Such a restriction on the authority of 
Associated Title would be illogical and unworkable. Quite 
clearly, to complete the sale and effect the transfer of title, 
the explicit grant of "full and complete authority" in the 
January 9, 1984 letter must include the implied authority to bid 
at the sale. No other conclusion is reasonably possible. 
In Q.S. Stapley Co. v. Logan. 6 Ariz.App. 269, 431 P.2d 
910, 913 (1967), the court said: "Well established in the law is 
the proposition that a principal cannot escape liability by 
leaving his business in the hands of agents, then denying their 
authority act for him." This is exactly what Bodell wishes to 
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do in the present case to avoid the effects of the original 
trustee's sale of August 31, 1984. 
POINT II 
ASSOCIATED TITLE HAD APPARENT AUTHORITY 
TO MAKE THE BID OF AUGUST 31
 r 1984 
In addition to the necessarily implied authority to make 
the bid to complete the foreclosure, all of the elements of 
apparent authority were present as well. For at least one month 
before the Trustee's Sale, Bodell was in frequent communication 
with defendant McOmber, who resided in the house, and Bodell 
communicated frequently with Mr. McOmberfs attorney. After the 
Trustee's Sale, Bodell took the position that McOmber was 
divested of title and Bodell thereupon signed a listing 
agreement to sell the house and collected and cashed rent checks 
from tenants in the basement of the house. 
In his Brief of Appellant, Bodell sets forth the three 
elements necessary to find apparent authority: 
1. Acts or conduct of the principal (Bodell); 
2. Reliance on those acts by a third person 
(here, McOmber or Snelson); and 
3. A resulting change in position by the third 
person. 2A C.J.S. Agency §157. 
(Brief of Appellant at 24.) 
Here, all of these criteria are met. First, Mr. Bodell 
granted full and complete authority to Associated Title and had 
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several telephone conversations with Mr. McOmber and his 
attorney about matters incident to the upcoming trustee's sale. 
Second, Mr. McOmber obviously relied on the authority of 
Associated Title by performing acts that indicated title had 
been divested from him, relinquishing the rent checks to Mr. 
Bodell, not resisting the transfer of names on the listing 
agreement, and, before the sale, negotiating with Mr. Bodell as 
though the upcoming Trustee's Sale was to be a valid sale. 
Third, Mr. McOmber obviously changed his position, namely having 
title to the property divested from him. 
in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 p.2d 73 (Utah 
1983), the court said that apparent authority exists where "a 
person has created such an appearance of things that it causes a 
third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second 
party has the power to act on behalf of the first person." 672 
P.2d at 75, citing Wynn v. McMahon Ford Co.r Mo.App. 414 S.W.2d 
330, 336 (1967) . In these circumstances, it would have been 
imprudent for Mr. McOmber to believe anything else. 
Bodell attempts to circumvent the first element of the 
apparent authority argument (acts by the principal) by arguing 
that Snelson never had any contact with Bodell (the principal) 
and that McOmber (the trustor) never discussed Associated 
Title's authority. (Brief of Appellant at 25.) Snelson was the 
co-maker on the note, not the trustor, and with respect to the 
trustee's sale, his knowledge would have no bearing. If it were 
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necessary to show that the third person (McOmber) "spoke with" 
the principal about the agent's authorityf there would never be 
a question of apparent authority raised. All cases would 
involve express authority or the lack thereof. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 49 states: 
§ 49. Interpretation of Apparent Authority 
Compared with Interpretation of Authority 
The rules applicable to the interpretation of 
authority are applicable to the interpretation 
of apparent authority except that: 
(a) manifestations of the principal to the 
other party to the transaction are interpreted 
in light of what the other party knows or should 
know instead of what the agent knows or should 
know, . . . 
In Comment b. to this Section, it is stated: 
fcL, Authority and apparent authority 
compared . . . . [T]here may be apparent 
authority created by the principal's 
acquiescence in the agent's conduct when this is 
known to the third person. Likewise, if the 
principal manifests to the third person that the 
agent is authorized to conduct a transaction, 
there is apparent authority in the agent . . . 
to do the incidental things which ordinarily 
accompany the performance of such transaction, 
unless the third person has notice that the 
agent's authority is limited. 
From his conversations with Mr. Bodell, Mr. McOmber knew 
that the foreclosure was proceeding. There was no reason for 
him to think that Bodell had withheld authority to do anything 
incident to the sale. 
Illustration 2. to Comment b. is as follows: 
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2. P sends A, his bookkeeper, to open an 
account for $10,000 and to borrow at a newly 
established bank, giving him a letter o 
introduction to the bank stating that A is 
authorized to borrow up to $10,000. He gives no 
instructions to A as to the rate of interest but 
A knows that P habitually pays 5 per cent. A 
presents the letter and borrows $10,000 at 6 per 
cent. If 6 per cent is not unreasonable, A has 
no authority but has apparent authority to do 
so. 
Knowing that Associated Tittle was Bodell's agent for purposes 
of the foreclosure, there was no reason for McOmber to believe 
that any of his acts were not authorized. 
Perhaps the apparent authority that Bodell's acts invested 
in Associated Title are best described by Comment c. to § 49: 
SL> Inferences from agent's position. Acts 
are interpreted in the light of ordinary human 
experience. If a principal puts an agent into, 
or knowledgely permits him to occupy, a position 
which according to the ordinary habits of 
persons in the locality, trade or profession, it 
is usual for such an agent to have a particular 
kind of authority, anyone dealing with him is 
justified in inferring that he has such 
authority, in the absence of reason to know 
otherwise. The content of such apparent 
authority is a matter to be determined from the 
facts. 
Mr. McOmber did not attend the trustees sale. At some time 
after it, he was informed that his title in the property had 
been extinguished. If he had checked with the Utah County 
Recorder's office, he would have discovered the Trustee's Deed 
which recited all the facts of the trustee's sale of which he 
had been previously informed by notices to him and in 
conversations with Mr. Bodell. Mr. McOmber was in no position 
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to inquire whether Mr. Heiner (acting for Associated Title) had 
written authorization to bid at $240,000 or to bid at all. 
There certainly was no appearance of irregularity. To the 
contrary, the Trust Deed carefully recited all necessary 
elements of a valid trustee's sale. Mr. McOmber appeared to be 
bound by the first sale. The district court correctly concluded 
that Bodell was bound as well. 
POINT III 
BODELL RATIFIED THE FIRST TRUSTEE'S SALE AND 
THE BID THAT RESULTED IN BODELL'S PURCHASE 
Even if Bodell's assertion that Associated Title exceeded 
its authority by bidding at the first trustee's sale were valid, 
Bodell clearly ratified Associated Title's purchase of the 
property on behalf of Bodell Construction. 
In Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571 (Utah 
1951), the court stated: 
Ratification like original authority need not be 
expressed. Any conduct which indicates assent 
by the purported principal to become a party to 
the transaction or which is justifiable only if 
there is ratification is sufficient. Even 
silence with full knowledge of the facts may 
manifest affirmance and thus operate as a 
ratification. 
Id. at 573-574. 
In Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 
1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Ratification is expressed or implied. Implied, 
where it arises under circumstances of 
acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not 
promptly exercised. Knowledge, usually, is a 
requisite to any form of ratification. 
In Lowe
 f the court held that a party with knowledge of a 
transaction and an agent's acts ratified the agent's acts by 
failing to disaffirm them within a reasonable time. 
similarly, in Poxey-Layton Co, 3L. Holbrook, 479 p.2d 348 
(Utah 1971), the court addressed a claim against the makers of a 
note who claimed they were not liable under the note because 
their alleged agent improperly and without authority wrote in 
payment terms on the note after they had executed it. The 
Supreme Court held that the makers of the note had ratified 
their agent's act by executing extensions of the note after 
learning that their alleged agent had inserted the payment terms 
about which they objected. 
These cases stand for the proposition that when a party, 
with knowledge of an alleged unauthorized act of his agent, by 
his conduct indicates that he affirms the agent's act, a 
ratification occurs. "Any conduct which indicates assent by the 
purported principal to become a party to the transaction or 
which is justifiable only if there is ratification is 
sufficient." Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sona, supra at 574. 
The application of the doctrine is especially clear when 
the party challenging the agent's authority accepts the benefits 
of the agent's exercise of such authority. In Moses v. Archie 
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MnFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah 1951), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that when an agent acts without authority, 
the principal cannot confirm such part of his action as is 
beneficial and reject such part as is detrimental 
ratification of part of the transaction ratifies the whole of 
the transaction. "If a principal ratifies part of a 
transaction, he is deemed to ratify the whole of it." Navrides v 
Zurich Ins. Co.r 488 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1971). Similarly, in Floor 
v. Mitchell, 41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935), the court said: 
When a principal claims the benefits of a 
contract made by his agent, he cannot repudiate 
the acts of his agent on the grounds such acts 
were unauthorized. Accepting a contract and 
claiming the fruits thereof, the principal takes 
with whatever taint attaches to its origin. 
Id. at 287. 
To the same effect, see Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc.f 100 
P.2d 619 (Utah 1940). 
Based upon the testimony of Michael Bodell, alone, the 
doctrine of ratification clearly applied and validated the bid 
made by Associated Title. Bodell testified that within a week 
to ten days after the August 31, 1984 sale, he knew that the 
sale had occurred and the amount that Associated had bid on his 
behalf at the sale. He also knew that he had become the owner 
of the property by virtue of Associated1s bidding and purchasing 
the property for Bodell at the sale. With that knowledge, 
Bodell proceeded to enjoy the benefits of property ownership. 
He, as owner, listed the property for sale as owner, accepted 
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and cashed at least one rent check from the property. He 
testified that if anyone had offered to purchase the property 
for the listed sale price, he would have sold the property to 
them. Bodell could not have it both ways. He cannot assert that 
he was the owner of the property and entitled to sell it and 
receive rent from it, but if things did not work out as he 
hoped, take the position that the bid resulting in his purchase 
of the property was unauthorized and he was never the owner. 
The record was uncontradicted that this is exactly what 
Bodell did. Notwithstanding his Affidavit (R.503) filed just 
before the final hearing in the district court, in which he says 
that he gave specific instructions to Mr. Terry that the 
possibility of a deficiency be preserved, Mr. Bodell learned 
that the entire debt had been bid as soon as he returned to Salt 
Lake City after the sale. He states that he was keenly 
interested in the foreclosure proceedings. However, with full 
knowledge of the bid price and the fact that he now owned the 
property, he proceeded to list it for sale in Bodell 
Construction's name as owner at a price very near the bid price, 
i.e. $239,000. (Bodell Depo. R.589 at 70-72, Exhibit 16.) This 
listing agreement was signed on September 10, 1984. (III.) Mr. 
Bodell testified concerning this listing. 
Q Did you have any input in the price for 
which the property was listed? 
A Yes. 
Q That was a number you were agreeable to? 
31 
A Yes. 
Q If two days after you signed this document, 
let's say on September 12, 1984, somebody 
had come to you and said: Mr. Bodell, I 
want to buy this property for $239,000 in 
cash, would you have sold it to them? 
A Yes 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 72.) 
However, early in October, Bodell became concerned about 
his ability to sell the property at this price. His testimony 
was as follows: 
Q Okay. I want to read, if I can, the entry, 
the first entry from October 2, 1984, there 
which is on the third page [of Exhibit 13 
to Bodell's Deposition (R.589). The note 
read was made by Roger Terry] . It says, 
"Mike Bodell called said was really 
concerned that home would not sell for 
amount of loan balance. Said he spoke to 
his attorney, Richard Rappaport. Said that 
Mr. Rappaport told him" either he or we 
"should have bid lower than loan balance 
if" he or we "felt home would not sell for 
more than owed in order to get a deficiency 
judgment. Mike requested that I pick him 
up and we meet with Mr. Rappaport to see 
what we can do to remedy the problem. Meet 
1:30 Wednesday." Have I fairly read that? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Is that an accurate statement of the 
communication from you to Mr. Terry on or 
about October 2, 1984? 
A In general it could have been. I mean the 
gist of it, yes. 
Q Do you see anything there that appears 
wrong to you or inaccurate? 
A Nothing inaccurate that I can pick out. 
32 
Q As of this date the property was still 
listed by you as owner; is that right? 
A I believe so, yes. 
• • • 
Q Why did you call Mr. Rappaport? 
A Because I wanted to know what we do now 
that it's becoming obvious to me that the 
property isn't going to solve me debt 
problem. Isn't going to be, isn't going to 
net us anywhere's near what is owed us. So 
the next step was, well, how do we get the 
difference. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 76-78.) 
In short, the record was uncontradicted that Mr. Bodell was 
concerned to undo what he believed had been accomplished, i.e., 
the sale to, and the acceptance by, Bodell Construction of the 
McOmber property. 
In his brief, Bodell contends that no intent to ratify was 
shown, or that the existence of such intent raises a question of 
fact. The rule that "a ratification requires the principal to 
have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify" is 
found in Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982), 
citing Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co.
 f 81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 
(1932) . The Mutual Creamery case involved a claim that the 
creamery was liable for injuries sustained by a child run over 
by a man under contract with the creamery to pick up eggs from 
farmers and deliver them to the creamery. The man used his own 
truck, set his own hours, and was paid by the crate of eggs 
delivered. After the accident in question, the contractor 
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continued to the farm which was his original destination, picked 
up the eggs, and delivered them to the creamery. The creamery 
accepted the eggs without being informed of the accident and 
with no other knowledge that the accident had occurred. To the 
contention that the creamery had ratified the relation of master 
and servant between it and the contractor, the court said: 
It is well recognized that, in order that a 
ratification of an unauthorized act or 
transaction of an agent or of another may be 
valid and binding, it is essential that the 
principal or the person making the ratification 
had full knowledge at the time of the 
ratification of all material facts and 
circumstances relative to the unauthorized act 
or transaction (2 C. J. 476) and also that an 
intention to ratify is essential and which must 
be shown either by an express or by an implied 
ratification 12 C. J. 484, 492). . . . [W]here 
he accepts the act or contract and seeks t o 
enforce it or claims the benefit of it. he is 
required to accept the whole of the transaction 
or contract, which, when ratified, will also 
bind the other party thereto, to the same extent 
as though it had been previously authorized. 
17 P. 2d at 259. (Empahsis added.) As with the element of 
intent in other circumstances, intent to ratify can be inferred 
from the acts of the person ratifying. 
Bodell claims that his action in reconveying the property 
to Associated Title shows he had no intent to ratify. This act 
occurred only after the acts of accepting title to the property, 
listing the property for sale, and accepting rents from it, and 
occurred only after Bodell realized that the property was not 
worth what Associated Title had bid for it. 
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A deliberate and valid ratification with full 
knowledge of all the material facts is binding 
and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled. 
Stark v. Starr, U.S. 477, 24 L.Ed. 276. 
Bradshaw v, McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). 
There can be no doubt that Bodell ratified the trustee's 
purchase of the property with full knowledge of the pertinent 
facts, 
Okay. So would it be a fair stcitement then 
that during the week or ten days after the 
first sale on August 31, 1984, you knew, 
were concerned about and objected to the 
amount that was bid at that sale? 
Again, prior to? 
During the week or ten days following the 
first sale you knew, objected to and were 
concerned about the amount that had been 
bid? 
I believe I testified that I am not certain 
the time frame, but approximately a week, 
week and half after, yes. Whether I first 
heard about that the sale was done and the 
amount I immediately objected to it. 
Okay. So when you signed the listing of 
the property as owner you knew that the bid 
price had been wrong and that you didn't 
like it; isn't that correct? 
Yes. 
And when you accepted the $200 rent check 
and cashed it, you knew that the bid price 
was wrong and that you objected to it; is 
that correct? 
I don't remember the time frames and the 
enter-relationship [sic]. 
You got the rent check according to Exhibit 
17 and your testimony over three weeks 
after the trustee's sale. 
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A Okay. 
Q If that is an accurate statement would it 
not be fair to say that when you cashed the 
check you knew that the bid price was wrong 
and you objected to it? 
A I think that would be logical. 
(Bodell Depo. R.589 at 79-81.) 
Bodell's other line of attack on the district court's 
conclusion that he ratified the sale is to claim a violation of 
the statute of frauds (§ 25-5-1 U.C.A. 1953). Associated Title 
was given authority to purchase the property by the trust deed 
(Bodell Depo. R.589, Exhibit 3) and the subsequent written 
appointment of it as successor trustee (Xd..f Exhibit 7) as 
required by Utah statute (§ 57-1-22, U.C.A.). Bodell does not 
contend that either the trust deed or appointment was ever 
revoked. Assuming for the sake of argument only the correctness 
of Bodell's contention that the bid or the bid price exceeded 
Associated Title's authority, Bodell nevertheless does not 
contend that the authorization to bid or to bid at a certain 
price must be in the original writing or in a separate writing. 
(Authority of a trustee to bid is set forth in § 57-1-27(1) 
U.C.A. (1953)). Accordingly, the ratification of the bid or the 
bid price need not be in a separate writing. Indeed, the only 




BODELL CANNOT NULLIFY THE AUGUST 31
 r 1984 
TRUSTEE'S SALE QN THE GROUNDS QF ITS OWN MISTAKE AND 
CONDUCT A SECOND SALE FOR ITS OWN ADVANTAGE 
At about the same time the district court entered its final 
judgment in the instant case, this Court issued its opinion in 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 
1990). The operative facts in both cases are remarkably similar. 
In the Mehr case, as here, the beneficiary, Occidental/Nebraska, 
bid in virtually the entire amount of its claim against the 
trustors (Mehrs) . As here, a second trustees sale was arranged 
and a substantially lower bid was entered at the second sale. 
The basis for abrogating the first sale and holding a second 
was, however, somewhat different. Insofar as the facts stated 
in opinion show, Occidental/Nebraska never admitted that the 
reason for conducting the second sale was that its bid at the 
first was too high. Mr. Bodell, on the other hand, candidly 
admits that he was motivated by these considerations. (Bodell 
Depo. R.58 9 at 73.) Occidental/Nebraska discovered that it had 
made a mistake in the foreclosure procedures by scheduling the 
first sale two months rather than the statutory three months 
after notice of default. It is uncontroverted in the instant 
case that the sale complied in all respects with Utah statute. 
Here, the mistake was allegedly made by the trustee, and Bodell 
wants to disavow the authority of the trustee. 
In the Occidental/Nebraska decision, this Court said: 
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Generally in legal proceedings a party with 
knowledge of all the facts will not be allowed 
to take a position, pursue that position to 
fruition, and later, with no substantial change 
in circumstance, return to attack the validity 
of the prior position or the outcome flowing 
from it. See 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver 
§§ 68-70. 
791 P.2d at 220. 
As with Occidental/Nebraska, Bodell attacks the validity of 
his own agent's acts that he initially accepted with no 
substantial change in circumstances to justify this change in 
position. 
Quoting Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 n.2 (Ut.App. 
1988), the Occidental/Nebraska opinion noted that: 
The "detailed procedural requirements for a 
trustee's sale of real property are intended to 
protect the debtor/trustor. " . . . The 
objective of the notice requirements is to 
protect the rights of those with an interest in 
the property to be sold. 
791 P.2d at 220 and citing Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty 
Servs. Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), the opinion stated the 
rule that 
A sale once made will not be set aside unless 
the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or 
there was some fraud or unfair dealing. Id. 
791 P.2d at 221. 
Here, Bodell has not alleged unfair dealings or the 
impairment of the interests of the debtors. He could not 
reasonably have done so. He does, at various places in his 
Brief of Appellant, imply that the rights of the trustors 
38 
(defendants-appellees) can be disregarded because they were 
passive bystanders in the foreclosure proceedings and did not 
take any overt steps with regard to it, see e.g. p.25 of Brief 
of Appellant where Bodell argues that since neither Snelson nor 
McOmber had much to do with the sale, their position could not 
have changed as required to find apparent authority. 
The Occidental/Nebraska decision recognizes that because 
the trustors must necessarily be in a passive position with 
respect to the sale, the detailed procedural requirements were 
meant and will be construed to protect them. Moreover, once a 
sale is completed a strong presumption of its validity arises 
unless an irregularity prejudicing the trustors is shown, or 
facts amounting to deception or fraud can be established. In 
this action, the trustee's deed filed with the Utah County 
Recorder on September 11, 1984 (Bodell Depo. R.589, Exhibit 14), 
one day after Mr. Bodell signed the listing agreement for the 
sale of the property, recites complete compliance with the 
statutory requirements for a trust deed foreclosure, and these 
recitals have never been challenged. 
Two cases from other jurisdictions support the rule that a 
beneficiary cannot hold a second sale merely because it did not 
like the results of the first sale. The first case is Bank of 
Myrtle Point v. Security Bank of Coos County, 718 p.2d 1373 
(Or.App. 1986). There, the defendant, Security Bank, had made 
a loan in the amount of $12,000 secured by a trust deed. The 
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plaintiff, Myrtle Bank, subsequently obtained two mortgages on 
the same property from the same borrowers. Then Security Bank 
consolidated the original $12,000 loan with other obligations 
and the borrowers defaulted on the entire loan. Security Bank 
then bid at the trustee's sale it initiated the entire debt 
which the borrowers owed it. After the sale, the plaintiff, 
Myrtle Bank, made demand upon Security Bank for the amount by 
which the bid exceeded $12,000, since it was senior to Security 
Bank for all liens except the original $12,000. After this 
demand, Security Bank elected to re-advertise and resell the 
land, and in order to accomplish that, Security Bank conveyed 
the land back to the trustee by a "deed of reconveyance." 
The principal question before the Oregon Court was whether 
the second trustee's sale was valid. The court held that it was 
not: 
Security Bank's bid and its acceptance by Stone 
[the trustee] constituted a sale of the 
property, ORS 86.755, which terminated 
plaintiff's interest in it. . . . Furthermore, 
both for trustee's and sheriff's sales under 
trust deeds and mortgages, . . . a bidder is 
bound by a bid at the sale in the absence of 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
A mistake on the part of the mortgagee or 
his attorney in bidding more than he 
intended will not itself justify an 
application or action by the mortgagee to 
set aside the sale. 
The making of such a bid at a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale 'finally fixes the value 
of the property therein sold' and clearly 
obligates the trustee who conducts the sale 
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to account . . . for the excess. Aneill 
Ranch v. Pet.itf 64 Cal.App.3d 277, 294, 134 
Cal.Rptr. 456 (1976). (Citations omitted.) 
See also Osborne, Mortgages, 740 § 344 (2d Ed. 
1970); 2 Wiltsie, supra, at 1432, § 891. None 
of the parties has raised issues of fraud or 
misrepresentation. Regardless of a mistake in 
the amount of its bid, Security is bound by it. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Bank of Myrtle Point v, Sec, Bank of Coos County. 718 P.2d 1373, 
1377-78 (Or.App. 1986). 
in Flaherty v, Davenport, 199 N.W. 904 (Minn. 1924), the 
facts are again quite similar to those before this Court. 
There, the plaintiff had applied to the trial court to set aside 
a foreclosure sale on the ground that his attorney had no 
authority to bid the property for him. The court disposed of 
the agency question without much discussion and took up the 
question of whether a mistake in the bid by the attorney as 
sufficient grounds for relief from the foreclosure: 
The claim, in substance, is that plaintiff had 
failed to inform his Minnesota attorney of the 
rendition of the Iowa judgment, and had failed 
to notify him of the amount to bid at the sale. 
In his affidavit plaintiff states: 
That affiant had not finally advised or 
informed his attorney for how much he 
should bid in said premises, and had not 
authorized him at the date to bid it in for 
the full amount of principal, interest, and 
costs of the foreclosure proceedings. 
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That an attorney authorized to bid in property 
at a foreclosure sale, without instructions as 
to the amount to be bid, bids it in for the full 
amount of the claim, furnishes no ground for 
setting aside the sale. 
199 N.W. at 904. 
The case before this Court is virtually identical to the 
Bank of Myrtle Point and the Flaherty case. It is significant 
to note that here, as in Bank of Myrtle Point, the beneficiary 
made no attempt whatsoever to obtain the consent of the trustor 
before purporting to set aside the first trustee's sale and 
conduct a second. 
Also, plaintiff fails to indicate how the reconveyance of 
the property from the beneficiary to the trustee, by way of a 
quit-claim deed, would reinstate the interest of the trustors 
(the defendants). If these interests were not reinstated, they 
cannot be affected by the second trustee's sale. The 
defendants' interests in the property were fully and finally 
terminated by the first trustee's sale and that sale must be the 
touchstone upon which any further claims against the defendants 
are based. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that Associated Title had actual authority and 
apparent authority to enter the bid on August 31, 1984. Even if 
that authority had been lacking on that day, Associated Title's 
acts were subsequently ratified by Bodell. In these 
42 
circumstances, plaintiff cannot set aside the sale merely 
because it was unhappy with it. 
Respectfully submitted this 
JJ^L d.y of 
DUNN & DUNN 
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